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United States v. Estate of Grace: Seeking a More
Objective Test for the Application of the
Reciprocal Trust Doctrine
Dennis I. Belcher and Kristen Frances Hager*
The reciprocal trust doctrine reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1969 in United States v. Estate of Grace.1 The Court in Grace
acknowledged the importance of the doctrine “to the administration of
the federal estate tax laws” and sought to develop a more objective test
for its application.2 The nearly fifty years following Grace have demonstrated that the Court’s decision was a step toward objectivity, but that it
failed to deliver sufficient clarity to maintain consistency in the lower
courts’ interpretations of its holding.
On December 15, 1931, Joseph Grace created the “Joseph Grace
trust” for the lifetime benefit of his wife, Janet Grace.3 Mr. Grace
funded the Joseph Grace trust with corporate stock, real estate, and an
interest in a joint venture.4 On December 30, 1931, Mrs. Grace created
the “Janet Grace trust” for the benefit of her husband, which was nearly
identical to the trust created by Mr. Grace fifteen days earlier. Mrs.
Grace funded this trust with the family homestead and certain corporate
securities, both of which she had received from her husband in preceding years.5 The trusts were created and funded in anticipation of the
enactment of the gift tax in 1932.6
Mrs. Grace died in 1937.7 The estate tax return filed by her estate’s
representatives disclosed the Janet Grace trust and reported her transfers to the trust as nontaxable. The Internal Revenue Service assessed a
* Dennis Belcher and Kristen Hager are partners in McGuireWoods LLP. Mr.
Belcher is a Past President of ACTEC.
1 United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
2 Id. at 318.
3 Id. at 318-19.
4 Estate of Grace v. United States, 393 F.2d 939, 943 (1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 316
(1969).
5 Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. at 319.
6 Id.; Estate of Grace, 393 F.2d at 943 (stating, “decedent believed that a new gift
tax would probably be enacted and become effective early in 1932, and he had decided
that additional trusts for the benefit of the family should be created prior to the close of
1931 in order to avoid paying the new gift tax in connection with transfers of assets to
such trusts.”)
7 United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 319 (1969).
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deficiency against Mrs. Grace’s estate on the premise that the Joseph
and Janet Grace trusts were reciprocal, and thus Mrs. Grace effectively
retained a life estate that must be included in her gross estate. Mrs.
Grace’s estate entered into a compromise agreement with the Internal
Revenue Service under which fifty-five percent of the Janet Grace trust
was included in her taxable estate.8
Mr. Grace died in 1950.9 His estate tax return reported the Joseph
Grace trust as a nontaxable transfer and reported the Janet Grace trust
as a trust over which Mr. Grace held a limited power of appointment.10
The Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency against Mr. Grace’s
estate on the basis that the Janet Grace trust was includible in Joseph’s
estate as a reciprocal trust.11 Mr. Grace’s estate paid the deficiency and
filed a claim for refund.12
The Court of Claims concluded that the Janet Grace trust should
not have been included in the estate of Mr. Grace because the decedent
had not created the Joseph Grace trust in consideration for his wife’s
creation of the Janet Grace trust, and that the lack of a “quid pro quo”
was the determinative factor.13 In reaching this conclusion,14 the Court
of Claims considered the origin of the reciprocal trust doctrine in Lehman v. Commissioner.15 In Lehman, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the decisive factor in its determination that a
trust should be included in the decedent’s estate was that the transfer of
property by the decedent caused his brother to make a nearly identical
transfer.16 The Court of Claims applied the Lehman quid pro quo test
and concluded that the Janet Grace trust was not funded in consideration for the trust previously funded by Mr. Grace.17
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve what it considered to be a conflict among the courts regarding the
proper interpretation of Lehman.18 The Court reversed the Court of
8 Id. The Court of Claims noted in its opinion that Mr. Grace preferred not to
litigate the reciprocal trust issue and instructed counsel for the Estate of Janet Grace to
make the best settlement possible. The Court further determined that this willingness to
compromise should not be considered an admission that the trusts were reciprocal. Estate of Grace, 393 F.2d at 947.
9 Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. at 319.
10 Id. at 319-20.
11 Id. at 320.
12 Estate of Grace v. United States, 393 F.2d 939, 944-45 (1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 316
(1969).
13 Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. at 321-22.
14 Id. at 321.
15 Lehman v. Comm’r, 109 F.2d 99 (1940).
16 Id. at 100.
17 Estate of Grace, 393 F.2d at 945-46.
18 United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 318 (1969).
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Claims approximately nineteen years after the death of Mr. Grace.19 In
its opinion, the Court held that the reciprocal trust doctrine does not
require a quid pro quo or a tax avoidance motive. The reciprocal trust
doctrine “requires only that the trusts be interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as they would have been in had they
created trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries.”20 The Court
concluded that to require consideration or a tax avoidance motive is to
require an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the grantors, and that
such a subjective inquiry is not workable under the federal tax law.21
The Supreme Court decided Grace under section 811(c)(1)(B) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.22 Section 811(c)(1)(B), as in effect
at Mr. Grace’s death in 1950, provided that the value of the gross estate
shall include all property transferred by a decedent during his lifetime
(other than in a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration)
under which the decedent retained the right to the income from the
property or the right to designate the persons who may enjoy the property or the income therefrom.23 Section 811(c)(1)(B), as in effect in
1950, is substantively identical to the current section 2036(a).24
The Court in Grace rejected the Lehman consideration test in favor
of the two-pronged interrelatedness and economic position approach
because the consideration test relied on the subjective intent of the parties.25 The Court also rejected the consideration test because of the difficulty of applying the notion of bargained for consideration to the intrafamily context.26 The Court moved to what it presumably saw as a more
mechanical test, which relied less on subjective intent and more on an
objective view of the facts of the transaction. The Court, however, gave
limited guidance on the application of this test beyond the facts that
were present in Grace. In reaching its conclusion that the Grace trusts
were interrelated, the Court cited to the substantially identical terms of
the trusts, the proximity in time of the creation of the trusts, and, most
importantly, that the trusts’ creation and funding were all part of a single plan developed by Mr. Grace.27 Having reached the conclusion that
19

Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 324.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 317. This section is codified today at I.R.C. § 2036.
23 I.R.C. § 811(c)(1)(B) (1939).
24 I.R.C. § 2036(a).
25 See United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 323-24 (1969).
26 Id. at 324. The Court in Grace does footnote that while consideration is not a
requirement, it may be a relevant factor in the application of the reciprocal trust doctrine.
Id. at 324 n.10.
27 Id. at 325.
20

92

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:89

the trusts were interrelated, the Court succinctly found that the transfers
left the parties in the same economic position as before.28
A multitude of questions remain after Grace. The Court describes
the Joseph and Janet Grace trusts as virtually or substantially identical,
but provides no guidance relating to whether substantive differences in
the trusts could have overcome the other factors that it considered. Fifteen days apart was deemed to be “approximately the same time.”29
How far apart in time would have made a difference, or would any
break in time have been rendered irrelevant by the determination that
both trusts were part of a single plan? Further, the Court did not wholly
abandon the importance of the subjective intent of the parties, footnoting that the intention of the settlors is a factor to be considered in the
interrelatedness determination.30 If the Court had given guidance on
the application of its two-pronged approach beyond its direct application to the facts of Grace, lower courts’ subsequent interpretations of
Grace may have developed with greater consistency.
The United States Tax Court in Bischoff v. Commissioner31 expanded the strict language of Grace by uncrossing trusts created by a
husband and a wife for the benefit of grandchildren.32 The Tax Court
concluded that the Supreme Court could not have intended by its holding in Grace to limit the application of the reciprocal trust doctrine to
estate inclusion under Section 2036(a)(1), and held the trusts to be includible in the husband’s and wife’s respective estates pursuant to sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1).33
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Green v. United States34 rejected the
application of the reciprocal trust doctrine to trusts created by a husband and wife for the benefit of their granddaughters because the settlors were not beneficiaries and retained no economic benefits.35 The
court reached this conclusion despite that the trusts, if uncrossed, would
have been includible in the settlors’ estates under sections 2036(a)(2)
and 2038(a)(1).36 In Green, the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected Bisch28

Id.
Id.
30 Id. at 324 n.10 (noting that “inquiries into the settlor’s reasons for creating the
trusts may be helpful in establishing the requisite link between the two trusts.”).
31 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
32 See id. at 43.
33 Id. at 48.
34 68 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1995).
35 Id. at 153-54.
36 Id. The government argued that interrelated trusts are taxable by virtue of the
reciprocal doctrine pursuant to I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) and asserted that “the only condition
precedent required to apply the doctrine and uncross the trusts was a finding of retained
settlor/trustee fiduciary powers” which leave “the settlors in approximately the same eco29
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off as a “strained and attenuated interpretation” of Grace.37 The courts
in Green and Bischoff, both relying on Grace, reached contrasting conclusions on similar facts.
Practitioners have long sought in the language of Grace and its
progeny a safe harbor from the application of the reciprocal trust doctrine, and practitioners have long been disappointed that no such safe
harbor has evolved. The two-pronged approach set forth in Grace remains the starting point in any analysis of the doctrine. Neither Grace
nor its successors, however, have provided a clear test for the determination of whether trusts are interrelated. The second prong of the
Grace holding, whether parties remain in the same economic position as
before the transfers, has been followed quite literally by some courts
and in others it has been reimagined to have a broader application.38
The Grace Court sought to provide a more objective test for the
application of the reciprocal trust doctrine in the estate tax context, but
history has shown the opinion in Grace to be an imperfect roadmap.

nomic position they would have been in had they created he trusts naming themselves as
beneficiaries.” See I.R.C. § 2036.
37 Green, 68 F.3d at 153.
38 Compare Bischoff v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 32, 45 (1977) (rejecting the limitation of the
application of the reciprocal doctrine to situations when settlors would be left in approximately the same economic position as by creating trusts naming themselves as beneficiaries, and focusing on whether the crossing of substantial economic interests, and not
merely crossing powers, had occurred ) with Green, 63 F.3d at 153 (requiring that the
settlor also retain economic benefit).

